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A business’s trademark protects its intellectual property, forms 
its foundation, and allows it to garner goodwill in its products or 
services; protecting its property rights in its trademark, therefore, is 
integral to the success of a business. The First Amendment freedom of 
speech is also integral to the lifestyle of American individuals and 
businesses alike. To what extent can an individual or business exercise 
its First Amendment freedom of expression without infringing upon 
the trademark of another?  
The Seventh Circuit addressed this question in a case where 
fiction and reality collide. In Fortres Grand Corporation v. Warner 
Bros. Entertainment, the owner of computer software that removes 
private data from public computers filed suit against Warner Bros. for 
unauthorized use of its trademark, “Clean Slate,” in the film The Dark 
Knight Rises and websites advertising the film. In the film, “the clean 
slate” describes a hacking program that enables Catwoman to rid 
databases of all evidence of her criminal past. Plaintiff alleged unfair 
competition under Indiana law and trademark infringement and unfair 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Thank you, all the 
wonderful Viranis in my life, for your endless love and support.  
1
Virani: Ka Bow! Seventh Circuit Knocks Down Trademark Claim
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
230 
competition under the Lanham Act, claiming that consumers were 
incorrectly led to believe that Fortres Grand’s software was related to 
the fictional program from the film.  
This note discusses the following matters: (1) the Lanham Act 
and its standard for a finding of trademark infringement; (2) the 
doctrine of “reverse confusion”; (3) the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of 
the reverse confusion doctrine in its 2014 ruling in the Fortres Grand 
case; (4) the extent of the First Amendment’s protection of creative 
expression when it implicates the trademark of another; and (5) the 
effect of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling on future trademark lawsuits 




A.  The Lanham Act 
 
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051 et seq, (the “Act”) 
codifies federal trademark law, providing for trademark registration 
and regulating the use of trademarks in commercial activity. Section 
45 of the Act defines a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof adopted and used by a 
manufacturer or merchant to identify and distinguish his goods, 
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by 
others.” 
1
 Further, a trademark must be used in commerce. 
2
 Because 
the Act provides such a broad definition, trademarks “can consist of 
almost any conceivable subject matter, from a word, symbol, picture, 
design, numeral, escutcheon, monogram, abbreviation, acronym, 
slogan, personal name, phrase, newspaper or magazine column title, 
title of a book series, [or] fragrance,” 
3
 among other representations.  
 
                                                 
1




 ANNE GILSON LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, 1-1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 
1.02 (2014). See also Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding 
that color in itself may be registered as a trademark under the Lanham Act). 
2
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 A trademark serves “to point distinctively, either by its own 
meaning or by association, to the origin or ownership of the wares to 
which it is applied.” 
4
 Trademark law is based on the notion that 
consumers are entitled to identify the source of a product. 
5
 The Act 
provides “national protection of trademarks,” which the United States 
Supreme Court has noted “is desirable . . . because trademarks foster 
competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the 
producer the benefits of good reputation." 
6
 Trademarks not only 
identify the source of goods, but also represent and generate goodwill 
for the producer. 
7
 The consistent production of high quality products 
that can easily be identified as originating from a particular producer 
creates a good reputation and goodwill for that producer that foster 
brand loyalty and generate sales.  
 
B. The Lanham Act Standard of Likelihood of Causing 
Confusion 
 
Section 32 of the Act provides civil liability for “any person 
who shall . . . use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services 
or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive.” 
8
 In § 43, the Act further provides civil 
liability for “any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false 
                                                 
4
 Estate of P. D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 
(1920). 
5
 See generally Tanqueray Gordon & Co. v. Gordon, 10 F. Supp. 852 (D.N.J. 
1935). 
6
 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985); see 
also San Francisco Arts & Ath. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 531 
(1987). 
7
 Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 
2099, 2120 (2004).  
8
 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1)(a) (2005). 
3
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or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person.” 
9
 These provisions of the 
Act serve a dual purpose: (1) to prevent the use of identical marks 
causing confusion to consumers about the actual source of goods and 




Preventing confusion as to the source of a good is intimately 
connected to protecting the goodwill of the trademark owner. The 
company owning the registered trademark is the senior user of that 
mark, while the company using an identical, unregistered mark is the 
junior user. If two competing goods use confusingly similar marks, 
consumers may misidentify the source of the goods; if consumers 
confuse the product of junior user Company A as produced by senior 
user Company B, Company B then loses control over consumer 
perception of its reputation. 
11
 Company A has infringed upon the 




Because actual confusion often cannot be proven, the essential 
test for trademark infringement is proof of the likelihood of confusion 
as to the source of the product at issue.
13
 This central question is based 
on whether consumers “are likely to believe that defendants’ products 
or services come from the same source as plaintiffs’ protected 
products or services.” 
14
 Courts make this determination on a case-by-
                                                 
9
 15 U.S.C § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
10
 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under 
Lanham Trademark Act, 187 A.L.R. FED. 271, § 2[a] (2003).  
11
 GILSON, supra note 3, § 1.03. 
12
 Id. at § 5.01. 
13
 Buckman, supra note 10, § 2[a]. 
14
 ANNE GILSON LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, 5-5 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 
5.01 (2014).  
4
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A likelihood of confusion may result from either forward 
confusion or reverse confusion.
16
 Forward confusion, the more 
traditional type, “occurs when a junior user of a mark uses it to sell 
goods or services based on the misperception that they originate with 
the mark’s senior user.” 
17
 Conversely, reverse confusion is 
characterized by a junior user’s saturation of the market with a 
trademark that is identical or similar to the senior user’s trademark. 
18
 
Generally, with respect to reverse confusion, the junior user is larger 
and more powerful than the senior user, 
19
 and “the junior user uses its 
size and market penetration to overwhelm the senior, but smaller, 
user.” 
20
 The senior user’s products are mistaken as originating from 
the junior user. 
21
 Consequently, this confusion harms the senior user 
by reducing the value of the trademark 
22
 as well as “its product 
identity, corporate identity, control over its goodwill and reputation, 
and ability to move into new markets.” 
23
 The doctrine of reverse 
confusion “protects the senior user’s control of its mark and the 
goodwill created by the mark from a junior user’s employment of the 
mark, and protects the public from believing that the senior user’s 








 Buckman, supra note 10, § 2[a].   
17
 Id.  
18
 Id. § 2[a]. 
19
 Id.  
20
 Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
21
 Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 701 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
22
 Id.  
23
 Buckman, supra note 10, § 2[a]. 
24
 Custom Vehicles, 476 F.3d at 484. 
5
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C. Reverse Confusion Doctrine 
 
While the Seventh Circuit eventually recognized reverse 
confusion in the 1992 case of Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker 
Oats Co.
25
, it had previously declined to acknowledge the doctrine in 
Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co. 
26
 Westward, the small 
senior user, registered and used the mark “Mustang” with the 
representation of a running horse to market its campers and trailers, 
which the large junior user Ford subsequently used to market its new 
sports car. 
27
 Finding “no rational basis for support” of Westward’s 
claim of reverse confusion,
28
 the Seventh Circuit analyzed the 
infringement claim under the traditional likelihood of confusion 
theory. The court held that because Westward’s sales were small and 
the scope of its business narrow, its trademark was weak and did not 
extend from campers to automobiles and its claim was not 
actionable.
29
 If unaltered in subsequent cases, this decision “would 
allow powerful junior users to undermine the trademark protection 
accorded smaller businesses through sheer economic strength.”
30
 Not 
only would such a rule disserve smaller businesses with senior rights 
to a mark, but also the very consumers that trademark law seeks to 
protect.  
 
Federal courts first recognized the doctrine of reverse 
confusion in the 1977 case Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire 
                                                 
25
 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir.1992) (holding for the first time that the trademark 
holder could receive damages for reverse confusion, finding that the Lanham Act’s 
objectives of protecting an owner’s interest in its trademark and preventing 
consumer confusion are as important in a case of reverse confusion as in traditional 
trademark infringement). 
26
 388 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1968). 
27
 Id. at 630. 
28
 Id. at 634. 
29
 Id. at 635. 
30
 Brent Folsom, Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits, 12 
J.CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 258, 259 (2001).  
6
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 In that case, junior user Goodyear saturated the 
market with smaller senior user Big O’s trademark “Bigfoot” to 
advertise its tires despite knowledge of the senior user’s ownership of 
the mark.
32
  The Tenth Circuit held that under state law, Big O had an 
actionable trademark infringement claim based on reverse confusion,
33
 
reasoning that “[s]uch a rule would further Colorado’s policy of 
protecting trade names and preventing public confusion.”
34
 Also 
significant in Big O’s argument was the testimony of more than a 
dozen witnesses who were actually confused about the source of Big 
O’s tires after watching a Goodyear commercial.
35
 The Tenth Circuit’s 
decision marked the first instance in which federal courts explicitly 
upheld an infringement case based on reverse confusion.  
 
D. Seventh Circuit’s Recognition of Reverse Confusion 
 
The Seventh Circuit first recognized reverse confusion in Sands, 
Taylor & Wood Co. v. The Quaker Oats Co., in which the small soft 
drink company and owner of the registered trademark “Thirst-Aid” 
sued the larger junior user, Quaker, for using its mark in an advertising 
slogan stating “Gatorade is Thirst Aid.”
36
 For the first time, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the trademark holder could receive damages 
for reverse confusion, finding that the Lanham Act’s objectives of 
protecting an owner’s interest in its trademark and preventing 
consumer confusion are as important in a case of reverse confusion as 




                                                 
31
 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976), aff’d, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977). 
32








 Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. The Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 949 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
37
 Id. at 958. 
7
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While many courts have since recognized trademark 
infringement based on reverse confusion, there remains little case law 
on the matter of a fictional good infringing upon the trademark of an 
actual product. 
38
 Some courts have held that Lanham Act analysis in 
reverse confusion cases should be modified “to reflect differences 
regarding the strength of a mark in which user’s mark should be 
analyzed.” 
39
 Courts have also held that Lanham Act analysis should 
be modified “to reflect differences regarding the defendant’s intent 
and bad faith.” 
40
 
 The Seventh Circuit has decided various reverse confusion 
cases, including its 2014 decision in Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner 
Bros. Entm’t Inc. In the Fortres Grand case, the Seventh Circuit 
employed a seven-factor test in which it considered: (1) the degree of 
similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion; (2) the 
similarity of the products for which the name is used; (3) the area and 
manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised 
by consumers; (5) the strength of the complainant’s mark; (6) actual 
confusion; and (7) an intent on the part of the alleged infringer to palm 




THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASE:  
GOTHAM’S NEWEST VILLIAN, THE INFRINGER 
 
Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. 
 
Fortres Grand holds a federally registered trademark for its 
security software program, “Clean Slate,” which is “used to protect 
public access computers by securing the computer drive back to its 
                                                 
38
 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:149 
(4th ed. 2014). 
39




 Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 702 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
8
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original configuration upon reboot.” 
42
. The security software is used 
to keep private data off of public computers. 
43
 As a security software, 
“its single most important characteristic is trustworthiness,” which had 
been established by Fortres Grand. 
44
 Fortres Grand obtained a federal 
trademark registration for “Clean Slate” in 2001 for a “computer 
software program used to protect public access computers by scouring 
the computer drive back to its original configuration upon reboot.” 
45
  
In 2012, Warner Bros. released the final installment of its 
Batman films, The Dark Knight Rises.
46
 In the film, the character 
Catwoman agrees to work with a “shadowy organization” in exchange 
for a software program developed by “Rykin Data Corporation” called 
“the clean slate,” which would allow Catwoman to remove her 
criminal history from all databases, thus wiping “her slate clean.” 
47
 
Upon completion of her work with the organization, Catwoman learns 
from the organization that she was betrayed and “the clean slate” does 
not exist. 
48
 The film later reveals that Batman’s alter ego, Bruce 
Wayne, had secretly obtained “the clean slate” software, which he 
offers to Catwoman in exchange for her help in saving Gotham City. 
49
 
The film’s conclusion suggests that Catwoman successfully used the 
software to wipe her slate clean of her criminal past, as she is living a 
normal life with Bruce Wayne. 
50
 Not only was the fictional “clean 
slate” software depicted in the film, but it was also used in 
promotional websites featuring the fictional Rykin Data Corporation to 
market the film. 
51
 While the websites did not feature “the clean slate” 
                                                 
42






 Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc.,947 F. Supp. 922, 924 
(N.D. Ind.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
46










 Id. at 700. 
9
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for purchase or download, the website did contain a description of the 
software and an image of a fictional patent. 
52
 
Fortres Grand experienced a decline in Clean Slate software 
sales following the film’s release, and attributes this decline to 
“potential customers mistakenly believing that its Clean Slate software 
is illicit or phony on account of Warner Bros.’ use of the name ‘the 
clean slate’” to describe a fictional software in the film. 
53
 Fortres 
Grand filed a three-count suit against Warner Bros.’ alleging (1) 
trademark infringement in violation of Lanham Act §§ 32, 43; 
54
 (2) 
unfair competition under the Lanham Act; and (3) unfair competition 




B. Procedural History 
 
Warner Bros. moved the district court to dismiss Fortres 
Grand’s claims, challenging the sufficiency of complaint to state a 
claim for trademark infringement 
56
 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 
57
 The 
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend 
Division, concluded that Fortres Grand had not sufficiently alleged 
trademark infringement because its claim lacked a plausible theory of 
consumer confusion. 
58
 The district court further held that Warner 
Bros.’ use of the phrase “the clean slate” was protected by the free 
speech guarantee of the First Amendment. 
59
 
Chief Judge Simon of the district court noted that there is little 
case law on whether a fictional company or product can infringe on a 






 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2012).  
55
 Fortres, 763 F.3d at 700. 
56
 Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 922, 925-
26 (N.D. Ind. 2013). 
57
 F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
58
 Fortres, 947 F. Supp.  2d at 927. 
59
 Id.  
10
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 The court compared Fortres Grand’s Clean Slate 
software and the Warner Bros.’ fictional “clean slate” software. 
61
 
Over Fortres Grand’s objections, the court also considered the contents 
of the fictional websites created to promote the film that mentioned the 
fictional “clean slate” software and its fictional creator, Rykin Data 
Corporation. 
62
 Although Fortres Grand argued that the contents of the 
websites should be disregarded because they were only referenced in 
the Complaint and not attached to it, the district court considered this 
matter. The Seventh Circuit has held that it has “taken a broader view 
of documents that may be considered on a motion to dismiss, nothing 
that a court may consider, in addition to allegations set forth in the 
Complaint itself, documents that are central to the complaint and are 
referred to in it.” 
63
 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The district court evaluated Fortres Grand’s claims of 
trademark infringement and state and federal unfair competition using 
the same trademark infringement analysis because all three claims are 
based upon the same law and facts. 
64
 The court noted that likelihood 
of confusion is central to a trademark infringement action, and “only a 
confusion about origin supports a trademark claim, and ‘origin’ for 
this purpose means the ‘producer of the tangible product sold in the 
marketplace.’” 
65
 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court 
further noted that trademark infringement does not protect against 
confusion of origin generally, but rather only mistaken purchasing 
decisions. 
66
 The court quickly ruled out the theory of forward 
confusion; because senior user Fortres Grand is not as prominent as 
junior user Warner Bros., Warner Bros. could not have attempted to 
                                                 
60




 Id. at 925. 
63
 Id. (citing Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013)).  
64
 Id. at 926. 
65
 Id. (quoting Eastland Music Group, LLC v. Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc., 707 F.3d 
869, 872 (7th Cir. 2013)); See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003). 
66
 Id. at 927; see also Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 
1190, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012). 
11
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“capitalize on” Fortres Grand’s “good will and reputation by 
suggesting that [its] product comes from the same source as does” 
Fortres Grand’s “Clean Slate” software. 
67
 
The district court then evaluated a theory of trademark 
infringement by reverse confusion, in which the “large senior user 
saturates the market with a trademark similar or identical to that of a 
smaller, senior user, ”leading consumers to believe the two products 
share the same origin 
68
 (internal quotes omitted). The court, in 
evaluating the similarity of the two products, found a major flaw in 
Fortres Grand’s argument that it has been “damaged by the reverse 
confusion resulting from Warner Bros.’ saturation of the market with 
its big-budget film and its promotional websites” 
69
 (internal quotes 
omitted). The district court noted that because “the clean slate” 
software from the film is a fictional software, the court must compare 
the parties’ ultimate products,
70
 which in this instance are Fortres 
Grand’s “Clean Slate” software to Warner Bros.’ film. 
71
  
A theory of reverse confusion, the court noted, would certainly 
have succeeded had Warner Bros. saturated the market with a 
campaign for an actual software called the “Clean Slate.” 
72
 However, 
in the present matter, the court compared Fortres Grand’s software to 
Warner Bros.’ film and held that Fortres Grand failed to plausibly 
allege: (1) consumer were deceived into believing the fictional 
software from the film originates from or is connected to Fortres 
Grand; or (2) consumers were deceived into believing that the film 
originates from or is connected to Fortres Grand. 
73
 Holding that no 
reasonable consumer would plausibly believe either of the 
aforementioned notions, the court concluded that Fortres Grand failed 
                                                 
67
 Fortres, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 926-27. 
68
 Id. at 927. 
69
 Id. at 928. 
70
 See Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 
1546 (S.D.Fla.1990); Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901(8th Cir. 2005). 
71
 Fortres, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 928. 
72
 Id. at 929. 
73
 Id. at 930. 
12
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to state a claim for trademark infringement under both the traditional 
“forward confusion” theory and the “reverse confusion” theory. 
74
 In 
dictum, the court postulated that even if Fortres Grand had alleged a 
plausible claim for likelihood of confusion, Warner Bros.’ use of 






The Seventh Circuit reasoned that “all three of Fortress 
Grand’s claims depended on plausibly alleging that Warner Bros.’ use 
of the words ‘clean slate’ is ‘likely to cause confusion’”
76
 under the 
Lanham Act 
77
. The court stated that only confusion about “origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of . . . goods supports a trademark claim”
78
 
(internal quotes omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim for infringement based on reverse confusion, Fortres 
Grand must have alleged that “Warner Bros.’ use of the words ‘clean 
slate’ in its movie to describe an elusive hacking program that can 
eliminate information from any and every database on earth has 
caused a likelihood that consumers will be confused into thinking that 
Fortres Grand’s Clean Slate software ‘emanates from, is connected to, 
or is sponsored by [Warner Bros.]’” 
79
  
The Seventh Circuit employed a seven-factor test in evaluating 
the plausibility of Fortres Grand’s allegation of confusion. 
80
 The court 
considered: (1) the degree of similarity between the marks in 
appearance and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products for which 
the name is used; (3) the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the 




 Id. at 931. 
76
 Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 700 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
77
 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2005).  
78
 Fortres, 763 F.3d at 701. 
79
 Id. (quoting Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 484 
(7th Cir. 2007)).   
80
 See generally Fortres, 763 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2014). 
13
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degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers; (5) the strength of 
the complainant’s mark; (6) actual confusion; and (7) an intent on the 




Fortres Grand argued that in finding that Fortres Grand failed 
to state a claim, the lower court improperly relied heavily on the 
“similarity of he products” factor when it concluded that Fortres 
Grand’s software and the Warner Bros.’ movie were not sufficiently 
similar as to plausibly cause confusion. Fortres Grand argued that 
instead of comparing its software to the movie, the court should have 
compared its software to the fictional software in the movie. 
82
 The 
issue, therefore, was whether the products are sufficiently similar as to 
cause consumers to attribute them to a single source.  
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit relied on cases of forward 
confusion that “have considered the likelihood of confusion between 
the senior user’s product and the junior user’s creative work – not any 
fictional product therein.” 
83
 In both Davis v. Walt Disney and Ocean 
Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, those respective courts 
compared the senior user’s product to the movie, not the fictional 
product in the movie. 
84
 The Seventh Circuit held that this approach 
aligns with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on “the tangible product 
sold in the marketplace.”
85
 
Applying the product similarity rule to reverse confusion, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that the proper tangible products to be 
compared, the software and the film, were “quite dissimilar.” 
86
 The 
                                                 
81
 McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1167-68 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (quoting Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc., 560 
F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977)).  
82




 Id.; see also Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2005); 
Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1557 
(S.D. FL 1990). 
85
 Fortres, 763 F.3d at 701 (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
86
 Id. at 704. 
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court further noted, “Fortres Grand has alleged no facts that would 
make it plausible that a super-hero movie and desktop management 
software are ‘goods related in the minds of consumers in the sense that 
a single producer is likely to put out both goods.’”
 87
 The similarity of 
the marks, the strongest factor in support of Fortres Grand’s argument, 
is not enough considering the weakness of the other factors.
88
 The 
court noted, “[t]rademark law protects the source-denoting function of 
words used in conjunction with goods and services in the marketplace, 
not the words themselves.”
89
 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s verdict in favor of Warner Bros., properly concluding that 
Fortres Grand did not plausibly allege trademark infringement based 
on reverse confusion.
90
 The Seventh Circuit did not, however, address 
the matter of First Amendment protections as related to trademarks 




A. Trademarks and First Amendment 
 
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides in relevant 
part that “Congress shall make no law [. . .] abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.” 
91
 Because the Seventh Circuit found that 
Fortres Grand’s Complaint did not sufficiently state a claim for reverse 
confusion, the court did not address the matter of First Amendment 
protections. 
92
 The lower court, however, held that Warner Bros.’ use 
of the term “clean slate” was also protected by the First Amendment.
93
 
                                                 
87
 Id.  
88






 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
92
 Fortres,763 F.3d at 698. 
93
 Fortres Grand Corporation v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 947 F.Supp.2d 922, 931 
(N.D. Ind. 2013). 
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In its holding, the lower court relied on the Second Circuit’s 
balancing test for application of the Lanham Act, as established in 
Rogers v. Grimaldi.
94
 The plaintiff in Rogers alleged that the 
defendant’s film violated the Lanham Act’s rights of publicity and 
privacy by creating the false impression that Ginger Rogers was 
associated with the film “Ginger and Fred”.
95
 In Rogers, the Second 
Circuit held that the Lanham Act must be narrowly construed, as 
application of the Lanham Act to the titles of artistic works may 
infringe First Amendment rights. 
96
 The Second Circuit reasoned that 
that the Lanham Act applied “to artistic works only where the public 
interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest 
in free expression.” 
97
 Because the film’s title had an ironic meaning 
and did not directly state that it depicted Ginger Rogers, the interest in 
free speech outweighed the potential misconception “that Rogers had 
some involvement with the film.” 
98
 Applying the Second Circuit’s 
test, the lower court in Fortres Grand reasoned that “the Lanham Act is 
inapplicable to ‘artistic works’ as long as the defendant's use of the 
mark is (1) ‘artistically relevant’ to the work and (2) not ‘explicitly 
misleading’ as to the source or content of the work.
99
 Finding that the 
Warner Bros.’ film constituted an artistic work, the lower court 
correctly reasoned that Warner Bros. satisfied both prongs of the 
Rogers test and was thus protected by the First Amendment. 
100
 
 While the Second Circuit discussed only the title of an artistic 
work, the Ninth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all expanded the 
                                                 
94
 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.1989); see also Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 
1007, 1016 (3d Cir. 2008). 
95
 Grimaldi,, 875 F.2d at 997. 
96




 Id. at 1001. 
99
 Fortres Grand Corporation v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 
922, 931 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 997).  
100
 Id. at 932; see also Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1016 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
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Rogers test to apply to artistic works generally. 
101
 Applying the 
Rogers test, the Second Circuit concluded that Warner Bros. use of the 
term “clean slate” was artistically relevant and did not explicitly 
mislead consumers as to the source of the work, satisfying both prongs 
of the Rogers test. 
102
 
 The statutory canon of constitutional avoidance mandates that 
courts construe statutes to avoid serious constitutional problems unless 
such a construction is contrary to congressional intent. 
103
 Where 
exactly, then, does the boundary between First Amendment rights and 
trademark rights lie? 
 The Supreme Court first discussed the application of First 
Amendment rights to commercial speech in Valentine v. Chrestenson, 
in which the Court held that “the Constitution imposes no restraint on 
government as respects purely commercial advertising.” 
104
 More than 
30 years later in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., the Court first held that the First Amendment 
protects commercial speech. 
105
  
Commercial speech is usually defined as “speech that does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction.” 
106
 The sale of an 
artistic work for profit does not make it per se commercial. 
107
 
“Trademark rights promote the aims of the First Amendment by 
enabling producers of the spoken and written word to differentiate 
                                                 
101
 Fortres, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 931; see E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star 
Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008); Univ. of Alabama Bd. of Trustees 
v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012); ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 n.11 (6th Cir.2003); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam 
Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir.1989). 
102
 Fortres, 947 F.Supp.2d at 932.  
103
 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988). 
104
 Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 




 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107
 Id. at 398. 
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 Although there is no conflict between free speech 
principles and trademark law, 
109
 commercial speech enjoys less First 
Amendment protection than non-commercial speech. 
110
 The Supreme 
Court held in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson “that expression by means 
of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press 
guaranty” even though film-making “is a large-scale business 
conducted for private profit.” 
111
 The Court “implicitly characterized 
motion pictures as noncommercial speech when it held this expression 
is protected by the First Amendment.” 
112
 Therefore, “use of another’s 
mark within the context of artistic of literary expression should 
generally be classified as noncommercial speech that is fully protected 
by the First Amendment.” 
113
 If the use of a trademark is misleading, it 
is excluded from First Amendment protections. 
114
 As in the Fortres 
Grand case, when an artistic expression is deemed noncommercial, it 
receives the full protection of the First Amendment. The courts must 
protect the fundamental right of free expression, especially when that 
expression is noncommercial and thus does not conflict with the 
commercial objectives that trademark law seeks to protect.  
 
B. Impact on Future Reverse Confusion Cases 
 
The Seventh Circuit has decided only a handful of cases in 
which plaintiffs’ claims were based on a theory of reverse confusion, 
holding in most that there was no likelihood of confusion as to violate 
the Lanham Act. Although there are few cases discussing whether a 
fictional good may plausibly infringe upon the trademark of an actual 
product, it is likely that such cases will be heard by courts more 
                                                 
108












 Id. at 412.  
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extensively as the worlds of actual goods, entertainment, and social 
media intermingle.  
While businesses hold an important interest in protecting their 
trademarks and the goodwill that may accompany it, the First 
Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression remains a central 
tenet of American culture for both individuals and businesses. The 
District Court of Northern Indiana properly decided in the Fortres 
Grand case that even if Warner Bros.’ use of the term “clean slate” in 
The Dark Knight Rises resulted in a likelihood of confusion among 
consumers as to the source of either parties’ products, Warner Bros. is 
protected by the First Amendment. When it comes to artistic 
expression, artists, like filmmakers, should be able to express an idea 
without fear of infringing upon the trademark of another. In the United 
Stated, there are two million registered trademarks and countless 
unregistered trademarks. It would be unduly burdensome for a 
filmmaker, for instance, to research every term or phrase it uses to 
ensure it has not violated the trademark of another. This burden is fair 
when a business is creating a product for use in commerce, because 
the research is limited, but excessively onerous for a filmmaker or 
other artist creating a more extensive work. 
Although the First Amendment protects artistic works from 
trademark infringement lawsuits, businesses must still protect their 
trademarks, along with their goodwill and reputation among 
consumers, with claims based on the Lanham Act. The reverse 
confusion doctrine is very much applicable when two goods or 
services in commerce using identical marks create a likelihood of 
confusion. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in the Fortres Grand 
provides an additional decision in the area of potential trademark 
infringement in entertainment, upholding and applying the doctrine of 
reverse confusion that has established its rank as a plausible theory for 
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